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Endogenous Fertility with Quasilinear Preferences*
Miki Matsuo†
Abstract
  This paper presents a static model with endogenous fertility, in which an 
individual has quasilinear preferences. In this case, an individual does not always 
have a child. First, we compare the fertility in the case of homothetic preferences 
with that of quasilinear preferences. Second, we consider the effects of child 
policy on fertility. If the government ensures a child allowance, fertility increases 
even if the government raises tax. This results from a strong income effect.
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1 Introduction
  There are considerable literatures concerning endogenous fertility, such as Becker and 
Barro (1989). In these literatures, it is assumed that the utility function is homothetic. 
Using homothetic preferences, it is possible to calculate an equilibrium in the dynamic 
model. Hence, homothetic preferences are used in various economics models. Under 
this assumption, an individual always has a child even if his/her income is 
infinitesimally low, except in the case of 0. In addition, when an individual has 
homothetic preferences, the income elasticity of fertility is positive and constant; i.e., 
fertility is determined proportional to income. However, these seem harder for 
explaining an individual's decision for having a child.
  In this paper, we present the model where an individual has quasilinear preferences. 
Because it is difficult to calculate the dynamics of fertility, we consider endogenous 
fertility problematic in the static model. In this case, we show that an individual does 
not always have a child when his/her income is extremely low. We demonstrate the 
income level at which an individual has a child. Moreover, we consider the effects of 
child policy on fertility.
  The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the basic model whose 
utility function is homothetic. Section 3 shows the model where an individual has 
quasilinear preferences. Section 4 discusses child policy for fertility. The final section 
concludes this paper.
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2 The Basic Model
2.1 Firm
  We consider a perfectly competitive economy. Firms are identical, and factor markets 
are perfectively competitive. There is a good for individual consumption, which is 
produced using a linear technology that employs only labor. A production function Y is 
defined as follows:
Y = AL,    A > 1,
where L and A denote the labor and the productivity of labor, respectively. In addition, 
we assume that A is constant. Taking consumption good as the numeraire, we assume 
the price as one. Then, given the wage rate w, the profit of a firm, π, is the following.
π = Y – wL.
Solving the profit maximization problem, we get the following first order condition.  
MPL = A ≡ w.
Therefore, the labor wage is constant over time.
2.2 Household
  Each individual is endowed with one unit of time and inelastically, supplying one unit 
of labor to a firm. This individual receives wage w and divides them among the 
consumption and the rearing costs of children. We assume that the rearing cost per 
child is m +βw, which is the sum of consumption m and opportunity cost βw (β > 0) 
for a child1. Then, the household's budget constraint is expressed by the following 
equation: 
                                                  w = c + (m +βw) n, (1)
where c and n represent the consumption and the number of children, respectively. 
１　See Boldrin and Jones (2002) and Fanti and Gori (2009).
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  An individual cares about the consumption and the number of children and the parent 
only makes decisions in the economy. Then, the individual’s utility function is specified 
as follows:
                                             u =γlog c + (1 –γ) log n, γ∈ (0,1), (2)
whereγand (1 –γ) denote preference toward consumption and the number of 
children, respectively2. Hence, an individual maximizes equation (2) subject to 
equation (1). 
  Solving the utility maximization problem, we get the optimal solutions as follows:
                                                     n = 
(1 –γ) w
　 　
(m +βw) , (3)
                                                     c =γw. (4)
  Then, differentiating equation (3) with respect to w, we get the first-derivative and 
second-derivative as follows:
dn
　 
dw
 = 
(1 –γ) m
　 　
(m +βw)2  > 0,
d 2n
　  
dw2
 = – 
2β (1 –γ) m
　 　
(m +βw)3  < 0.
  Therefore, fertility increases with an increase in wage, as described by Figure 1. In 
addition, the income elasticity of a child is expressed by
dn
　 
dw
 
w
　
n
 = 
m
　 　
m +βw .
  The income elasticity of child is positive, less than 1, and constant.
  With homothetic preferences, there is no way of deciding not to have children. 
Therefore, even if a household income is considerably low, an individual may have 
some children.
２　In this section, we suppose the homothetic preferences that are used generally in theoretical 
analysis.
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Figure 1. The optimal fertility in the homothetic preferences case
3 The Case of Quasilinear Preferences
3.1 The Model
  In the previous section, we show endogenous fertility in the case in which an 
individual has homothetic preferences. In this case, although income is very low 
(except ), an individual with homothetic preferences has some children. In this section, 
we present the model in which an individual has quasilinear preferences. First, we 
provide the model in this case and compare with the fertility in the homothetic 
preferences case. Second, we consider the effect of child policy on fertility by 
introducing the government.
  Similar to the previous section, an individual cares about the consumption and the 
number of children. In this section, in place of equation (2), the utility function is 
specified as follows: 
                                                 u =γlog c + (1 –γ) n. (5)
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  Then, an individual utility maximization problem is 
max u =γlog c + (1 –γ) n,
c,n 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
s, t,    w = c + (m +βw) n.　
  Solving the above problem, the optimal fertility and consumption are as follows:
                              n = 
w
　 　
m +βw  – 
γ
　 　
1 –γ
,    if w > 
γm
　 　
1 –γ–βγ
, (6.a)
                              c = 
γ
　 　
1 –γ
 (m +βw),       if w > 
γm
　 　
1 –γ–βγ
, (6.b)
                              n = 0,                         if w <–  
γm
　 　
1 –γ–βγ
, (7.a)
                              c = w,                         if w <–  
γm
　 　
1 –γ–βγ
. (7.b)
  Differentiating equation (6), we have  
dn
　 
dw
 = 
m
　 　
(m +βw)2  > 0,   　
d 2n
　  
dw2
 = – 
2βm
　 　
(m +βw)3  < 0.
dn
　 
dw
 > 0                          　
where n is equal to 0 until income reaches 
γm
　 　
1 –γ–βγ
. After the income increases more 
than 
γm
　 　
1 –γ–βγ
. the value of n increases in the income. Therefore, fertility is depicted 
in Figure 2. 
  In addition, the income elasticity of a child is as follows:
dn
　 
dw
 
w
　
n
 = 
(1 –γ) mw
　 　
(m +βw)｛(1 –γ–γβ) w –γm｝.
  In this case, the above income elasticity depends on income. 
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Figure 2. The optimal fertility in the quasilinear preferences case
  On the other hand, consumption is monotonically increasing with respect to income. 
The income consumption curve is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Income consumption curve
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4 Analyses of Child Policy
4.1 The Model
  In this section, we consider child policy, in which the government provides child 
allowance for a household. To finance this child allowance, the government imposes a 
lump-sum tax,τ, on every individual3. In addition, we suppose that the size of 
population is expressed by N in the economy. 
  By denoting the child allowance per child by z, the budget constraint of a household is
                                              w –τ + zn = c + (m +βw) n. (8)
  An individual makes decisions on consumption and fertility so that he/she maximizes 
utility subject to equation (8). The household problem is as follows:
max u =γlog c + (1 –γ) n,  　　
c,n　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
s, t,    w –τ + zn = c + (m +βw) n.
  Solving the above problem, we get the optimal fertility as follows:
                    n = 
w – τ
　 　
m +βw – z  – 
γ
　 　
1 –γ
,    if w > 
γ(m – z) + (1 –γ)τ
　 　
1 –γ–βγ
, (9.a)
                    c = 
γ
　 　
1 –γ
 (m +βw – z),       if w > 
γ(m – z) + (1 –γ)τ
　 　
1 –γ–βγ
, (9.b)
                    n = 0,                             if w <–  
γ(m – z) + (1 –γ)τ
　 　
1 –γ–βγ
, (10.a)
                    c = w –τ,                        if w <–  
γ(m – z) + (1 –γ)τ
　 　
1 –γ–βγ
. (10.b)
  Denote w ≡ 
γ(m – z) +(1 –γ)τ
　 　
1 –γ–βγ
, which is the income level of an individual with a 
child.
  Then, since the income level w decreases as z increases, an individual can have a 
child easily by providing child allowance. In contrast, an increase in the tax decreases 
the income level w.
  Therefore, it is harder for an individual to have a child.
３　Since we assume that an individual is identical, there is no income difference. Therefore, we 
have the same results as lump-sum tax in the case of proportional income tax. 
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4.2 Government
  With regards to the public sector, the government revenue and expenditure are 
represented by  and , respectively. Therefore, the government budget constraint is 
expressed by
                                                             τ = zn. (11)
4.3 Equilibrium
  To analyze the effects of tax on fertility, we substitute  into equation (9.a) and obtain 
the following quadratic equations:
                              n2 (m +βw) + [ γ　 　1 –γ  (m +βw) – w] n – γ　 　1 –γτ = 0. (12)
  Calculating the discriminant of the above equation, we have the discriminant as 
follows:
D = [ γ　 　1 –γ  (m +βw) – w]
 2
 + 4 (m +βw) ( γ　 　1 –γτ) > 0.
  Hence, we find that equation (12) has two real roots. Solving quadratic equations by 
using a quadratic formula, we get the following two roots:
n* = 
        γ                             γ                                          γ
 – [　　  (m +βw) – w] ± √[　　  (m +βw) – w]
 2
 +4 (m +βw) (　　 τ)      1 –γ                         1 –γ                                      1 –γ 　 　
2 (m +βw)
.
  Then, we find one root is positive and another is negative as showed Figure 4. 
Therefore, the optimal fertility is as follows: 
n*= 
        γ                             γ                                          γ
 – [　　  (m +βw) – w] + √[　　  (m +βw) – w]
 2
 +4 (m +βw) (　　 τ)      1 –γ                         1 –γ                                      1 –γ 　 　
2 (m +βw)
 . (13)
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– 1 　2  [ γ 　1γ + w　 　2m + βw ] 
Figure 4. Solution of quadratic equations
  From equation (13), an increase in tax increases fertility. In the economy, the 
government ensures a child allowance z per child. Hence, if the population is 
sufficiently large, the government must increase the tax on every individual in order to 
sustain a child allowance level. Even if the government imposes lump-sum tax to 
ensure child allowance, fertility increases due to the income effect in this case. 
Exercise
  In the previous section, we substituted z = 
τ
　
n
 into equation (9.a) and considered the effect 
of tax on fertility. In this exercise, we analyze the effects of child allowance on fertility. 
We eliminate  in equation (9.a) and derive fertility in the equilibrium. Substituting 
equation (11) into equation (9.a), we obtain fertility in the equilibrium.
                                    n* = 
1
　 　
m +βw  [w – γ　 　1 –γ  (m +βw – z)]
 
. (10)
  Then, from the above equation, an increase in z raises the fertility. 
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5 Conclusion
  This paper presents a static model, in which individual utility is based on quasilinear 
preferences. In this model, we show that an individual does not always have children. 
Moreover, we consider the effect of child policy on fertility. We observed that if the 
government ensures providing a child allowance per child z, the government could 
raise fertility in the economy, even if the government imposes increased tax on the 
household. Moreover, if the government raises the child allowance per child, fertility 
could increase in the economy. 
  Finally, it would be interesting to extend this model into a dynamic model and analyze 
the policy effect on fertility. Moreover, we could introduce the model into a pay-as-
you-go pension system and analyze the manner in which the social security system 
affects fertility in the economy.
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